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Abstract
The ways in which natural selection can allow the proliferation of cooperative behavior have long been seen as a central
problem in evolutionary biology. Most of the literature has focused on interactions between pairs of individuals and on
linear public goods games. This emphasis has led to the conclusion that even modest levels of migration would pose a
serious problem to the spread of altruism through population viscosity in group structured populations. Here we challenge
this conclusion, by analyzing evolution in a framework which allows for complex group interactions and random migration
among groups. We conclude that contingent forms of strong altruism that benefits equally all group members, regardless of
kinship and without greenbeard effects, can spread when rare under realistic group sizes and levels of migration, due to the
assortment of genes resulting only from population viscosity. Our analysis combines group-centric and gene-centric
perspectives, allows for arbitrary strength of selection, and leads to extensions of Hamilton’s rule for the spread of altruistic
alleles, applicable under broad conditions.
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Introduction
The evolution of cooperation and altruism are fundamental
scientific challenges highlighted by their role in the major
transitions in life’s history, when natural selection acted simulta-
neously on several competing levels [1–8]. In this context, the
relevance of basic concepts, including group selection and
Hamilton’s rule remain controversial [9–18]. Here we address
these problems by studying a framework for evolution in group
structured populations that incorporates inter- and intra-group
competition and migration. Combining group-centric with gene-
centric perspectives in a constructive group/kin selection ap-
proach, we build methodology that allows for the analysis of
arbitrary non-linear fitness functions, resulting from complex
multi-individual interactions across life cycles. We obtain the
conditions for a rare social allele to invade the population. This is
obtained in a mathematically rigorous way, by analyzing the
stability of the equilibrium in which this allele is absent. This
analysis is done for arbitrary strength of selection, but when
selection is weak and groups are large the condition for invasion
simplifies significantly into a form that is easy to apply and
provides substantial intuition. In the case of linear fitness functions,
the condition for invasion is identical to Hamilton’s rule, and it is
natural to regard the more general non-linear cases as general-
izations of that rule. Our results also show that one of the most
widely used approaches to analyzing kin selection models, [19],
[7](condition (6.7)), and [16](Box 6), yields incorrect results in
some biologically relevant situations.
Our results reveal conditions that are biologically realistic and
under which altruism can evolve when rare even with modest
genetic relatedness in groups, without kin recognition or green-
beard effects (the altruistic acts benefit all group members equally).
In this way we challenge a common understanding according to
which inter-group selection favoring altruism could only override
intra-group selection favoring selfishness under exceptional
conditions, namely small group size and very low migration rates
[13,17,20–28]. The issue is illustrated by quoting from the recent
review [13], p.12: ‘‘For group selection to overcome selection
within groups, less than one succesfully reproducing migrant may
be exchanged per two populations per population lifetime.’’ The
fact that this idea is still incorporated in mainstream evolutionary
biology is illustrated by the theoretical considerations on pp. 11, 12
of the influential recent textbook [29], where one reads: ‘‘[…] for
group selection to work populations must be isolated, such that
individuals cannot migrate among them. Otherwise there would
be nothing to stop the migration of selfish individuals […]. Once
selfish individuals arrive, their genotype would soon spread. In
nature groups are rarely isolated sufficiently to prevent such
immigration.’’
We identify the emphasis on linear public goods games in the
literature, including most of the papers quoted in the previous
paragraph, as having supported this belief in exceptionality. For
these games, the condition for altruism to proliferate is Hamilton’s
classical rule, requiring the relatedness in groups to exceed the
ratio of cost to benefit for each altruistic act. Therefore, in this
setting, altruism can only spread when either relatedness is large,
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or the cost/benefit ratio is low. And since relatedness is often low
[28] (Table 8.3), [30], [31] (Tables 6.4 and 6.5), [32], [33] (Table
4.9), exceptionally low cost/benefit ratios are required, as observed
for instance in [34]. In the absence of reasons to expect low cost/
benefit ratios to be common, researchers whose intuition is molded
by the linear public goods game are naturally led to the belief that
altruism could only spread through population viscosity in
exceptional cases.
In contrast, we show that for iterated public goods games, in
which altruists cooperate or not in each round based on previous
outcomes [35,36], altruism can spread even when cost/benefit
ratios for each altruistic act are reasonably high, groups are large,
selection is weak and migration rates are substantially larger than
the inverse of group size (high gene flow, realistically low
relatedness). This result corrects [36], who predicted that large
group size would not allow cooperation to spread when rare in this
model. For species that live in groups, several vital group activities
repeat themselves periodically and behavior changes as feedback is
obtained from previous iterations. The iterated public goods game
that we study is therefore often more realistic than a simple one
shot public goods game. A proper analysis of this model fills
therefore an important gap in the literature. (To illustrate the fact
that the incorrect conclusion from [36] is still incorporated in the
literature, we refer the reader to, e.g., Section 4.5 of the textbook
[37] and p. 359 of the very recent textbook [29]).
To obtain our result in the case of weak selection and large
groups we show that in the absence of selection, when groups are
large, the fraction of group members that are close relatives of a
randomly chosen individual has a non-Gaussian distribution with
a fatter tail. As a consequence, even when altruistic alleles are rare
in the population, they have a significant probability of
concentrating in some groups, accruing substantial reproductive
gains through multi-individual synergy.
The Two-Level Fisher-Wright Framework
When members of a species live in groups, their reproductive
success depends on the behavior of all group members. More
efficient groups may grow faster and split, outcompeting the less
efficient ones that die out. On the other hand, individuals may free
ride on the cooperation of other members of their group, and in
this way outcompete them. This picture is further complicated by
migration among groups. The Two-level Fisher-Wright framework with
selection and migration (2lFW) captures all these elements, in a
simplified fashion. (In the last two paragraphs of this section we
explain how it relates to the trait group framework and budding-
viscosity models.) In 2lFW haploid individuals live in a large
number g of groups of size n, and are of two genetically
determined phenotypic types, A or N. Generations do not overlap,
reproduction is asexual and the type is inherited by the offspring
(mutations will be considered briefly later). The relative fitness (w)
of a type A, and that of a type N, in a group that has k types A,
are, respectively, wAk~1zdv
A
k and w
N
k~1zdv
N
k , with the
convention that vN0~0, i.e., w
N
0~1. The quantities v
A
k and v
N
k
represent life-cycle payoffs derived from behavior, physiology, etc.
The parameter d§0 indicates the strength of selection. Figure 1
describes the creation of a new generation in the 2lFW through
inter- and intra- group competition, followed by migration at rate
m.
Cases in which types A behave in some altruistic fashion are of
particular interest [38]. Most of the literature concerns the very
special case of a linear public goods game (PG), defined by
vAk~
k{1
n{1
B{C,
vNk~
k
n{1
B,
with 0vCvB, in which each type A cooperates, at a cost C to
herself, providing a benefit B shared by the other members of her
group. The need to consider more complex intra-group interac-
tions and non-linear payoff functions is, nevertheless, well known
[10,14,30,35,36,39–49]. Non-linearities appear naturally whenev-
er activities involve many group members simultaneously. They
result from threshold phenomena, increasing returns to scale,
saturation, etc. For instance, to hunt large prey may require a
large minimum number of hunters, the likelihood of success may
first increase rapidly with the number of hunters, but it may
plateau when this number becomes very large. Allowing for the
analysis of such synergistic multi-individual interactions and
activities is a central feature of our approach, distinguishing it
from theoretical frameworks based on pairwise interactions, or
single actors benefiting a group [4,50,51].
The 2lFW framework can be seen as a generalization of the
trait-group framework (see Sec. 2.3.2 of [5]), which corresponds to
the case m~1. One can interpret 1{m as a viscosity, or an
assortment parameter. Because migration is completely random in
2lFW, this assortment represents a worst case scenario, abstracting
away additional assortment caused by kin recognition, greenbeard
effects, selective acceptance of migrants, joint migration of
individuals, etc. We notice that, according to [52], the 2lFW can
be classified as a Type II group selection model, as the intergroup
competition component qualifies as an explicit group level event
that is absent in a trait-group model. It is well known [35,36,43]
that even when m~1 non-linearities in fitness functions allow for
coexistence of cooperators and defectors. But under the strong
altruism condition vAkz1vvNk (meaning that each type A would be
better off mutating into a type N), this is not the case [38,53]. One
of our goals is to determine the level of migration compatible with
invasion by rare strong altruists.
The model with the population structure of 2lFW and PG
payoffs was studied in [54] with the name ‘‘budding-viscosity
model’’. But, as the authors explained on p.1714, this name may
not be appropriate in some applications. We propose the name
‘‘two-level Fisher-Wright framework with selection and migration’’
to denote a mathematical structure applicable to several demo-
graphic/reproductive biological systems, including group fission-
ing and budding, and admitting arbitrary payoff functions. This
name also emphasizes that selection occurs at the individual and
the group levels. In [54] motivation for the population structure is
discussed in detail, references to previous work leading to it are
provided (notably [55]) and an explanation of how it allows
viscosity to increase relatedness without increasing in the same
measure the competition among relatives (as is the case in an
island model with inelastic group size [56]) is presented. The
analysis in [54] relied on the assumptions of PG payoffs and weak
selection (dvv1). The paper [57] provides an alternative analysis,
which depends on the same strong assumptions, in the section
called ‘‘typical kin selection model’’. This paper was a response to
[58], where group selection was argued to be an important
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and a multilevel
selection model based on Moran’s model was introduced. In [57]
it was argued that kin selection is a better tool for studying
evolution in group structured populations. In the context of this
Altruism Can Proliferate despite High Gene Flow
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debate, our analysis of 2lFW with non-linear fitness functions
highlights the importance of combining group-centric with gene-
centric perspectives, and shows that group selection can be an
important force in evolution under realistic conditions. It also
shows that mathematically rigorous analysis can be carried out, to
a large extent, even when selection is strong, fitness functions are
non-linear and migration rates are arbitrary. And it shows that one
has to be very careful in applying mathematically non-rigorous
methodology, as it can produce substantially incorrect results, even
when selection is weak. We will see this when we observe that
methods based on the approximation of regression coefficients by
partial derivatives lead to such incorrect results in important
examples.
Results
A Basic Example: Iterated Public Goods Game
Non-linearities in life-cycle payoffs can result from activities
repeating themselves during a lifetime, and behavior being
contingent on previous outcomes. A basic example is the iterated
public goods game (IPG) [35,36]. In IPG a PG is repeated an
average of T times in a life-cycle. We will suppose that types N
never cooperate, while types A cooperate in the first round and
later cooperate only if at least a fraction a of group members
cooperated in the previous round. The payoffs (see Figure S1 in
File S1) are, therefore, given by
vAk~
k{1
n{1
B{C, if
k
n
v a ,
T
k{1
n{1
B{C
 
, if
k
n
§ a ,
8><
>:
vNk~
k
n{1
B, if
k
n
v a ,
T
k
n{1
B, if
k
n
§ a ,
8><
>:
for constants 0vCvB, T§1 and 0ƒaƒ1 (C and B are costs
and benefits in each iteration). Mathematically, this model
generalizes the iterated prisoner dilemma and tit-for-tat, from
the dyadic setting of [59] and [60] to the multi-individual setting.
But while direct or indirect reciprocity requires the identification
of individuals in the group, this is not the case here. The behavior
of types A in the IPG can be triggered by individuals simply
discontinuing cooperative behavior when previous cooperation
produced negative feedback to them, for instance, when they
received a negative payoff. In other words, allele A can predispose
individuals to cooperate, but as they do it and obtain feedback
from that behavior, they may continue it or discontinue it. The
IPG is in this sense closely related to generalized reciprocity
mechanisms [61,62] with low cognitive requirements. (In gener-
alized reciprocity models individuals interact in pairs, and
generalized reciprocators help any other member of the group,
but only in the first iteration, or when they were helped by some
group member in the previous iteration. In contrast, in the IPG
the actions involve several individuals simultaneously, but as in
generalized reciprocity, individuals react to their own previous
experience, without having to remember who did what.) Negative
feedback from cooperation should occur if the fraction of group
members that cooperated was less than C=B, but not if it was
larger than that threshold, since in the former case the payoff to a
cooperator is negative, while in the latter case it is positive. This
gives a special role to the value a~C=B.
When are types A altruistic in the IPG? There is more than one
way in which the concept of altruism in the context of the trait-
group framework has been defined [38]. These different defini-
tions carry over to the 2lFW. A particularly simple concept is
called in [38] the ‘‘multilevel interpretation’’ of altruism. That
definition requires the two conditions wAkvwNk , for all k, and wk
increasing in k. The first one means that types A are always worse
off than types N in the same group, and the second one means that
the more types A in a group, the better for the group. Both
conditions are clearly always satisfied in the IPG.
There are nevertheless good arguments for considering other
definitions of altruism [38]. A particularly appealing definition is
Figure 1. Diagram of the 2lFW process. (Left) FW intergroup competition: Each group in the new generation independently descends from
a group in the previous generation, with probabilities proportional to group average fitness wk~
kwAkz(n{k)w
N
k
n
: (Center) FW Intragroup
competition: If a group descends from a group with k types A, then it will have i types A with probability P(k,i)~bin(iDn,kwAk =nwk), where the
binomial probability bin(iDn,q) is the probability of i successes in n independent trials, each with probability q of success. (Right) Migration: Once
the new g groups have been formed according to the two-level competition process, a random fraction m of the individuals migrates. Migrants are
randomly shuffled. Note: The assignment of relative fitness to the groups in the fashion done above is a necessary and sufficient condition [68] for
individuals in the parental generation to have each an expected number of offspring proportional to their personal relative fitness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0072043.g001
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called ‘‘focal-complement interpretation’’ in [38], and is often
known as ‘‘mutation condition’’, or ‘‘strong altruism’’. Suppose
that a type N mutated into a type A, everything else remaining
unchanged. Would this cause a decrease in the fitness of the
mutant? Would it cause an increase in the average fitness of the
other members of the mutant’s group? Since the average fitness of
the n members of the mutant’s group increases with the mutation,
the answer to the second question will be affirmative whenever the
answer to the first question is affirmative. Therefore the condition
for types A to be strongly altruistic is that vAkz1{v
N
k v 0 for all k.
In File S1 (Section S8, last subsection) this condition is shown to be
satisfied when aƒC=B and to fail otherwise.
To sum up, if aƒC=B, the behavior of types A is altruistic in
the strong sense that each type A individual would increase its
fitness if it behaved as a type N, everything else being equal, i.e.,
vAkz1vvNk . Moreover, types N always free ride and have greater
fitness than types A in the same group, regardless of the values of a
and T , i.e., vAkvvNk .
Figure 2 displays a detailed analysis of some instances of the
IPG, giving conditions for allele A to spread when rare (In this
figure, a~C=B, so that, in particular, types A are strongly
altruistic). For many species that live and interact in groups for
many years, several vital activities, including collective hunting
and food sharing, can repeat themselves hundreds or thousands of
times in a life-cycle, giving plausibility to the values of T in
Figure 2. The assumption that individuals discontinue behavior
after a single unsuccessful participation is a simplification. When
this is not a realistic assumption, we can, however, interpret the
parameter T as the ratio between the typical number of repetitions
of the activity and the typical number of unsuccessful attempts
before cooperation is discontinued by a type A.
Panel C, in which selection is weak and groups are large, shows
two important contrasting results. When T~1, and the IPG is
identical to the PG, allele A can only invade under Hamilton’s
condition R~FSTwC=B. But as T increases, the level of
relatedness needed for invasion drops substantially, so that for
modest values of B=C, allele A can invade under R~FST
significantly lower than 10%, compatible with levels observed in
several species, including humans [28] (Table 8.3), [30], [31]
(Tables 6.4 and 6.5), [32], [33] (Table 4.9). The corresponding
number of migrants per group per generation, nm~(1{R)=(2R),
can be of the order of 10. Further examples showing the spread of
altruism and cooperation under high levels of gene flow and low
levels of relatedness are provided in Figure S5, S6, S7 and S8, S20
and S21 in File S1.
The 2-player iterated prisoner dilemma has been analysed in
detail in the literature, as reviewed, for instance in Chapter 4 of
[37]. In this setting, when types N are defectors and types A play
tit-for-tat, types A will not be able to invade when rare, if
assortment is random (because then they are typically paired with
defectors and lose in fitness to those by cooperating in the first
iteration). A very modest level of relatedness is nevertheless
sufficient to allow tit-for-tat to proliferate when rare, as computed
in Section 4.1.2 of [37]. Our computations here provide similar
results for the n-player iterated public goods game and correct the
computations in Section 4.5.1 of that text, which had indicated
that types A would require very high levels of relatedness to
invade. In File S1 (Section S8, next to last subsection), we explain
in detail what assumption in [36], reproduced in [37], led to that
incorrect conclusion.
It is important to also emphasize a relevant difference between
tit-for-tat in 2-player iterated prisoner’s dilemmas and types A with
aƒC=B in n-player public goods games (as in Figure 2). The
former can proliferate under random assortment provided that
initially they are not very rare. This is so because, when common,
tit-for-tat is not altruistic; cooperation in each iteration assures
continuation of cooperation, and in the long run benefits the
cooperator. In contrast, the latter is strongly altruistic in the sense
that vAkz1vvNk and therefore never proliferates under random
assortment ([53], reviewed in [38]). In other words, while 2-player
reciprocity is sometimes not altruistic, but rather cooperative, the
behavior of types A that we are studying in Figure 2, is genuinely
altruistic rather than simply cooperative.
Condition for Invasion Under Strong Selection
To analyze the 2lFW, denote by fk(t), k~0,:::,n the fraction of
groups in generation t that have exactly k types A. Denote by
p(t)~
Pn
k~1 (k=n)fk(t) the frequency of types A in the population.
The state of the population in generation t is described by the
vector f (t)~(f1(t),:::,fn(t)), since f0(t)~1{
Pn
k~1 fk(t). We will
suppose that g&n, so that, by the law of large numbers, f (t)
evolves as a deterministic (non-linear) dynamical system in
dimension n. Here we will study its linearization close to the fixed
point (0,:::,0), with no types A. This means that we are restricting
Figure 2. Iterated public goods game (IPG). A public goods game
(PG) is repeated an average of T times in a life-cycle. In each round each
individual can cooperate at a cost C to herself, producing a benefit B
shared by the other members of the group. Types N never cooperate,
while types A cooperate in the first round and later cooperate only if at
least a fraction a of group members cooperated in the previous round.
In all panels a~C=B (types A are strongly altruistic) and curves
correspond to T~1 (black, this case is identical to PG), 10 (blue), 100
(magenta), 1000 (green) (bottom to top in Panel A, top to bottom in
Panels B and C). Panel A: C~1, B~3, n~50. Curves give the critical
migration rate ms below which types A proliferate when rare, and that
solves r(ms)~1, or equivalently Dp~0 in (1). (The subscript ‘s’ stands
for ‘survival’.) The dependence of ms on the strength of selection d
indicates the relevance of studying both weak and strong selection.
Short horizontal red lines indicate value of ms under weak selection,
obtained from setting Dp~0 in (2) (note the excellent agreement).
Panel B: Again, C~1, B~3, n~50. Curves give the critical relatedness
R0s~R
0(ms) above which types A proliferate. Here R
0(m)~(1{m)2=
(n{(n{1)(1{m)2)&1=(1z2nm) is the relatedness obtained from
neutral genetic markers. Short horizontal red lines are again from
Dp~0 in (2). Panel C: Limit of large n under weak selection. Critical
values of relatednessR~FST~1=(1z2nm), as function ofC=B. Solid lines
provide the solution to the equation C=B{R~(T{1)R(1{C=B)1=R
derived from setting Dp~0 in (3). Dashed lines give its approximation (5).
Red vertical line corresponds to C=B~1=3, while horizontal red lines are
at the same level of those from Panel B. Their intersections illustrate the
fact that both the solid and dashed lines in Panel C are good
approximations to weak-selection values of critical relatedness, R0s , when
n~50.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0072043.g002
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ourselves to the case in which p%1, and studying the conditions
for allele A to invade the population when rare. With the notation
introduced in Fig. 1, we have then f (tz1)~f (t)Md(AzB),
where
Mdk,i~wkP(k,i)~wkbin iDn,
kwAk
nwk
 
,
Ai,j~bin(jDi,1{m),
Bi,j~imdj,1,
where bin(iDn,q) represents the binomial distribution with n trials
with probability of success q and we use the standard Kronecker
notation di,j~1 if j~i and dj,i~0 if ji. Matrix M
d represents the
production of groups in the new generation, through the two-level
competition, prior to migration. Matrix A represents the effect of
types A migrating out of groups, and matrix B represents the effect
of these migrant types A joining groups that previous to migration
had no types A. (Explanation for A and B: When p%1, the
migrant types A are a small fraction of the migrant population,
and therefore each one is likely to settle in a different group that
had no types A before migration. A group that had i types A prior
to migration will therefore have j types A after migration with the
probability given by Ai,j above. To understand the form of B now,
note that such a group that had i types A prior to migration will
contribute an average of im migrant types A, who will therefore
produce that same number of groups with exactly one type A
each.)
A standard application of the Perron-Frobenius Theorem (See
Section 2 of File S1) implies that when t&1, we have, in good
approximation, f (t)~Crtn, where C is a constant that depends on
f (0), rw0 is the leading eigenvalue of Md(AzB) and n is its
corresponding left-eigenvector normalized as a probability vector.
This means that, regardless of the initial distribution f (0), with
0vp(0)%1, demographics and natural selection drive f (t)
towards multiples of n, in what can be seen as self-organization
of copies of A in the optimal stable way for them to spread. Once
this has happened, p(t) grows at rate r. Consequently, allele A will
proliferate, when rare, if the viability condition rw1 holds, and it will
vanish if rv1 (see Figure 2 and Sections S1 and S2 in File S1 for
applications and further explanations, see also Figure S2 to S9 in
File S1 for illustrations). When rw1, even if allele A is initially
absent, a small rate of mutation will introduce it, allowing it to
then invade the population. In the terminology of evolutionary
game theory (see, e.g., [28](Chapter 7)), phenotype N is an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) when rv1 and N is not an ESS
when rw1.
The viability condition rw1 has a gene-centric (kin-selection)
interpretation in terms of average (neighbor modulated) fitnesses.
For this purpose, define Dp(t)~p(tz1){p(t). Then it is well
known that WDp~p(WA{ W )~p(1{p)(WA{WN ), where
WA and WN are the average fitnesses of types A and N, and
W~pWAz(1{p)WN is the average fitness of all individuals. If
we choose a random type A, it will have probability proportional
to kfk of being in a group with exactly k types A (Bayesian
sampling bias, reviewed in Section S3 of File S1). Therefore
WA~1zd
Pn
k~1 kfkv
A
k =
Pn
k~1 kfk. When p%1, if we choose a
random individual, it is likely to be in a group with no types A.
Therefore, in good approximation, W~1. Since f (t) is driven
towards multiples of n, we obtain.
Dp~ pd
Pn
k~1 knkv
A
kPn
k~1 knk
, ð1Þ
provided p%1 and t&1 (the error term is of order p2+bt, with
0vbv1). The viability condition rw1 can also be stated as
Dpw0, in (1). It is important to observe that p(t) does not need to
be monotone, and that Dpw0 is the proper condition for invasion
only when, as in (1), one is considering the stationary regime, t&1.
(See Figures S10, S11, S12 and S13 in File S1 for illustrations of
the onset of this stationary regime.)
Weak Selection
If selection is weak, i.e., dvv1, migration acts much faster
than selection, providing a separation of time scales [3,57,63–65].
This allows us to replace n in (1) with n0, obtained by assuming
d~0 within error of order d (see also Figure S15 and S16 in File
S1). Defining now pk~kn
0
k=(
P
i~1,:::,n in
0
i ), allows us then to
rewrite the neighbor modulated fitness relation (1) in the form
Dp~ pd
Xn
k~1
pkv
A
k ð2Þ
(within error term of order d2). Algebraic simplifications (presented
in Section S5 of File S1) transform the eigenvalue equation for n0
into the following equations for p~(p1,:::,pn):
pQ~p,
Xn
k~1
pk~1,
with the n|n matrix Q given by
Qi,j~mdj,1 z (1{m) bin (j{1 Dn{1,(1{m)i=n):
Matrix Q is a Markov transition matrix (i.e., Qi,j§0 andP
j~1,:::,n Qi,j~1) and p is its invariant probability distribution
(see Section S5 in File S1 and Figure S17 in File S1 for details).
They have natural interpretations in terms of identity by descent
(IBD) under neutral genetic drift, as we explain next when we
provide a second, independent, derivation of (2). This derivation is
gene-centered, and is more intuitive and simpler than the
derivations in the previous section. But it relies heavily on the
assumption that selection is weak.
Two individuals are said to be IBD if following their lineages
back in time, they coalesce before a migration event affects either
one (see Figure S14 in File S1 for an illustration of the concept).
The separation of time scales implies that when selection acts, the
demographic distribution is well approximated by that obtained in
equilibrium with d~0. This means that in good approximation
WA~1zd
P
k pkv
A
k , where pk is the d~0 equilibrium probabil-
ity that in the group of a randomly chosen focal type A there are
exactly k types A (focal included). But because we are supposing
that types A are rare, the only individuals that are type A in this
group are those that are IBD to the focal, so that pk is also the
probability that exactly k individuals in this group are IBD to the
focal. As in the derivation of (1), since types A are rare, we have
W~1 and hence Dp~p(WA{1)~dp
Pn
k~1 pkv
A
k , which is (2).
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Now, the probability pj that the focal is IBD to exactly j{1
other members of her group is dj,1 if the focal is a migrant
(probability m), while if she is not a migrant (probability 1{m),
then we have to consider how many individuals in her mother’s
group were IBD to her mother. If, counting her mother, that
number was i (probability pi, assuming demographic equilibrium)
then the probability that the focal is IBD to exactly j{1 other
members of her group is equal to the probability that of the n{1
other members of her group, exactly j{1 are non-migrants who
chose for mother one of the i candidates (among n possibilities)
that were IBD to the focal’s mother (probability
bin(j{1Dn{1,(1{m)i=n)). Combining these pieces, we have
pj ~ mdj,1 z (1{m)
Xn
i~1
pi bin j{1Dn{1,(1{m)
i
n
 
:
This is exactly the same as the set of equations pQ~p.
The IBD distribution p contains all the relevant information
about genetic relatedness in the groups, including and exceeding
that given by the average relatedness between group members,
R~(1{m)2=(n{(n{1)(1{m)2) (see Figure S18 in File S1),
obtained from lineages, regression coefficients, or Wright’s FST
statistics. (See Sections S3 and S5 in File S1 for a review on these
alternative, equivalent, definitions of relatedness, and its compu-
tation.) Specifically, we can define R as the probability that a
second member chosen from the focal’s group is IBD to the focal
and then obtain (from linearity of expected values) that
R~((
Pn
k~1 kpk){1)=(n{1) is a linear function of p’s first
moment. When vAk is a non-linear function of k, more information
contained in p, including its higher moments, is needed to decide
whether Dpw0 in (2). (In [66] the second moment of p was used to
obtain conditions for invasion by rare greenbeards in an island
population structure.) It is important to also stress that (2) can be
easily used for applications in which even the knowledge of all the
moments of p (see [63]) would be cumbersome to apply, as for
instance in the computation of the short horizontal red lines in
Figure 2, Panels A and B.
Large Groups Under Weak Selection
The stationarity condition p~pQ allows for a recursive
computation of all the moments of p (see Section S5 in File S1).
These moments can then be used to show the powerful result that
if n is large and m is small, then p, when properly rescaled, is close
to a beta distribution, with mean R~FST (see Section S6 and
Figure S19 in File S1). In this case, if in addition to the assumption
of weak selection, also vAk is well approximated by
*
vk=n
A , for some
piecewise continuous function
*
vx
A, 0ƒxƒ1, then (2) takes the easy
to apply form
Dp~ pd
1
R
{1
 ð1
0
(1{x)
1
R
{2 *
vx
A dx, ð3Þ
where R~
1
1z2nm
. Equations (1) and (3) play complementary
roles in the analysis of 2lFW. Both provide the condition for
invasion by allele A; (1) holds in full generality, while (3) requires
special assumptions (small d, large n), but is computationally much
simpler and provides a great deal of intuition, as we discuss next.
Equation (3) should be contrasted with what [36] predicted by
supposing that the number of individuals in a group that are IBD
to a focal individual would be well approximated by a binomial
with n{1 attempts and probability R of success. That would lead
to a normal distribution, narrowly concentrated close to its mean
R, in place of the beta distribution above. Our result reveals a
strong dependency structure among lineages, producing the beta
distribution, with a standard deviation comparable to its mean,
and a tail that decays slowly compared to a Gaussian distribution.
As a consequence, fitness functions that are large only when the
fraction of types A in a group is above a threshold value, as in the
IPG, will allow for proliferation of types A under levels of
relatedness substantially lower than that predicted under the
assumption in [36] (for another example see also Section S7 and in
File S1 and Figure S20 in File S1). We will refer to the fact that the
fraction of group members that are IBD to a focal individual has a
non-vanishing standard deviation, even when selection is weak and
groups are large, as persistence of variability. This phenomenon poses
a severe limitation to the applicability of covariance-regression
methods in which regression of fitness on genotype is replaced with
derivatives, as in [19], [16](Box 6), [7](condition (6.7)). Both the
assumptions in [36], or in [19] applied to the IPG would have
implied incorrectly that when selection is weak and groups are
large, types A could only invade the population when rare if
RwC=B (these computations are presented in Sections S8 an S9
in File S1). In a companion paper [37] we show that
methodologies in which one expresses the fitness of a focal
individual in terms of partial derivatives with respect to the focal
individual’s phenotype and the phenotype of the individuals with
whom the focal interacts, as in [3,7,16,19,51,57], require Ax to be a
linear function of x.
For the PG, (2) and (3) clearly reduce to the well known
Dp~pd({CzBR). The same is also true for the more general
(1), as was shown in [22], where in case of strong selection the
relatedness R depends on the payoff functions. (The derivation in
[22] was based on the Price equation. An alternative derivation is
provided in Section 4 of File S1.) In contrast, if we are under the
conditions of (3) with
*
vx
A~{CzBxzB2x
2z:::zBlx
l , then
Dp~ pd ({CzBRzB2R2z:::zBlRl), ð4Þ
where Rl~l!R
l=½((l{1)Rz1)((l{2)Rz1)    (Rz1) is the l-th
moment of the beta distribution.
For the IPG,
*
vx
A~{CzBx, if 0ƒxva, and Ax~({CzBx)T ,
if aƒxƒ1. The viability condition derived from (3) can be
analyzed in detail, by simple, but long, computations, presented in
Section S8 in File S1 and illustrated by Figure S21–S26 in File S1.
In the case a~C=B, the viability condition reads
C=B{Rw(T{1)R(1{C=B)1=R. When T is large, this yields
the following approximation for the critical relatedness R~FST :
R~
{ ln (1{C=B)
lnT
: ð5Þ
If also C=B%1, then
R~
C=B
lnT
~
C=B
2:3 log10 T
: ð6Þ
The simplicity and transparency of (5) and (6) illustrate the
power of (3), and Fig. 2 shows how well they compare to the more
general, but less transparent (1). Note also how (5) and (6) provide
a direct grasp on the effect of the number of repetitions in the
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game, and a nice comparison between the PG and the IPG. Both
Figure 2 and (6) show that alleles that promote contingent
cooperative behavior, which is discontinued when participation is
low, can spread under levels of genetic relatedness (~FST ) more
than 5 times smaller than C=B. This mechanism should, therefore,
be seriously investigated as a possible route for the proliferation of
altruistic/cooperative behavior.
Conclusions
1. Natural selection in group structured populations is best
analyzed by a combination of group-centric and gene-centric
perspectives and methods. Both shed light, carry intuition and
provide computational power, in different ways. For instance,
in this paper the analysis of invasion under strong selection
focused on groups, while that under weak selection focused on
genes. Our computations indicate the advantage of a pluralistic
group-centric/gene-centric approach over views that regard
one of these two approaches as being redundant, less
informative, or counterproductive. Contrast, on one hand,
with, e.g., [14], which to us seems excessively negative about
the contributions of kin selection ideas. And contrast, on the
other hand, with, e.g., Section 6.5 of [17], or the subsection on
group selection in Chapter 15 of [29], which to us seem
excessively negative about the contributions of group selection
ideas).
2. Rigorous mathematical analysis of models is sometimes
possible even when fitness functions are non-linear, selection
is possibly strong, and the migration rate is arbitrary. And it is
needed for assessing the validity of non-rigorous approaches,
showing for instance that regression coefficients may be poorely
approximated by partial derivatives, even when selection is
weak. (Contrast with, e.g., [19](from (1) to (2)), [51]((3.4), (3.5)),
[16](Box 6), [7](condition (6.7)).)
3. Hamilton’s condition for the spread of altruism, CvBR,
should be complemented with more general rules (like those
obtained by setting Dpw0 in (2), (3), or (4)) that extend it to
non-linear fitness functions. In Section 9 of File S1, we
compare these extensions of Hamilton’s condition to other
extensions, based on covariance-regression formulas, like
display (5) in [16]. We observe there that for the fundamental
purpose of computing critical levels of relatedness needed for
invasion, in term of parameters of the models, like in (5) and (6)
above, covariance-regression formulas are incomplete in that
they must be complemented with computations of the
appropriate distribution of alleles in groups. And once these
distributions are computed, our methods are much more direct
and simpler.
4. Contingent forms of group altruism that are discontinued when
participation is low can proliferate under biologically realistic
conditions even in large groups. Their role in the spread of
altruism should be empirically investigated. (Contrast with
[36].)
5. Natural selection can promote traits that (in net terms over a
full life-cycle) are costly to the actors and beneficial to the other
members of their group, under demographic conditions that
are not stringent. This can happen in large groups and with
realistically high levels of gene flow, through population
viscosity, without the need for kin recognition or greenbeard
effects. Excessive focus on one-shot linear public goods games
in the literature has obscured this fact. (Contrast with, e.g.,
[13,17,20–29].)
Supporting Information
File S1 Supporting Information. Figure S1, Payoff profiles.
Payoffs vAk for types A are represented by black squares, while red
circles depict payoffs vNk for types N. From left: Public goods game
(PG, Example 1) for n=20, C=1 and B=5. Iterated public goods
game (IPG, Example 2) for n=20, C=1, B=5, a=4 and T=2.
Threshold model (THR, Example 3) for n=20 C=1, h=4 and
A=A9=10. Figure S2, Perron-Frobenius eigenvalues r as a
function of m for d=0.1, 0.2 and 0.4. From top to bottom: Public
goods game (PG, Example 1) with n=20, C=1, B=5. Iterated
public goods (IPG, Example 2) with n=20, C=1, B=5, a=8 and
T=10. Threshold model (THR, Example 3) with n=20, C=1,
h=4, A=A9=10. Critical migration values ms are obtained by
solving r(ms) = 1. Figure S3, Public goods game (Example 1):
Panel A represents critical values ms as a function of the strength of
selection d. Curves correspond to the case C=1, B=2 and n=10
(top, black dotted line), n=20 (middle, blue dashed line) and n=50
(bottom, magenta full line). Short horizontal red lines indicate
critical values at the weak selection limit obtained from (2) in the
paper. The inset shows the same curves within the full range of
possible values for ms, illustrating the well known fact that for this
model, only under exceptional conditions can the allele A invade.
Panel B depicts the same conditions except for B=5. Figure S4,
Public goods game (Example 1): Critical relatedness R0s~R
0 msð Þ
above which types A proliferate, as a function of the strength of
selection d. (R0(m) = (1– m)2/(n – (n –1)(1– m)2) < 1/(1+2nm) is the
relatedness obtained from neutral genetic markers; see Sections S5
and S7). Panels correspond to the same parameter values as in
Figure S3: C=1, B=2 and n=10 (bottom, black dotted line),
n=20 (middle, blue dashed line) and n=50 (top, magenta full
line). Panel B depicts the same conditions except for B=5. Short
horizontal red lines indicate critical values at the weak selection
limit obtained from Hamilton’s rule R0s~C=B , or, equivalently,
from (2) in the paper. Note the appreciable effect of the strength of
selection. Figure S5, Iterated public goods game (Example 2):
Critical values ms as a function of the strength of selection d. Panel
A depicts the case n=20, C=1, B=5, a=4 with, respectively from
bottom to top, T=1 (dotted black line), T=10 (dashed blue line),
T=100 (dot-dashed magenta) and T=500 (green full line). Panel
B depicts the same conditions except for a=8. Short horizontal
red lines indicate critical values at the weak selection limit obtained
from (2) in the paper. Each curve has T fixed, but to compare
different values of T, the product dT is a natural measure of
strength of selection, and is used in the horizontal axis. Figure S6,
Iterated public goods game (Example 2): Critical relatedness
R0s~R
0 msð Þ above which types A proliferate, as a function of the
strength of selection d. (R0(m) = (1– m)2/(n – (n –1)(1– m)2) is the
relatedness obtained from neutral genetic markers; see Sections S5
and S7). Panels correspond to the same parameter values as in
Figure S5: Panel A depicts the case n=20, C=1, B=5, a=4 with,
respectively from top to bottom, T=1 (dotted black line), T=10
(dashed blue line), T=100 (dot-dashed magenta) and T=500
(green full line). Panel B depicts the same conditions except for
a=8. As in Figure S5, each curve has T fixed, but to compare
different values of T, the product dT is a natural measure of
strength of selection, and is used in the horizontal axis. Short
horizontal red lines indicate critical values at the weak selection
limit obtained from (2) in the paper. These values are: Panel A:
0.2000, 0.0865, 0.0402, 0.0243. Panel B: 0.2000, 0.1099, 0.0638,
0.0452. Note the very low values of critical relatedness in Panel A.
Figure S7, Threshold model (Example 3): Critical values ms as a
function of the strength of selection d. Panel A depicts the case
n=20, C=1, h=4, A9=2A, with, respectively from bottom to top,
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A=5 (dotted black line), A=10 (dashed blue line), A=50 (dot-
dashed magenta) and A=100 (green full line). Panel B depicts the
same conditions except for h=8. Short horizontal red lines
indicate critical values at the weak selection limit obtained from (2)
in the paper. Each curve has A fixed, but to compare different
values of A, the product dA is a natural measure of strength of
selection, and is used in the horizontal axis. Figure S8, Threshold
model (Example 3): Critical relatedness R0s~R
0 msð Þ above which
types A proliferate, as a function of the strength of selection d.
(R0(m) = (1– m)2/(n – (n –1)(1– m)2) is the relatedness obtained from
neutral genetic markers; see Sections S5 and S7). Panels
correspond to the same parameter values as in Figure S7: Panel
A depicts the case n=20, C=1, h=4, A9=2A, with, respectively
from top to bottom, A=5 (dotted black line), A=10 (dashed blue
line), A=50 (dot-dashed magenta) and A=100 (green full line).
Panel B depicts the same conditions except for h=8. As in Figure
S7, each curve has A fixed, but to compare different values of A,
the product dA is a natural measure of strength of selection, and is
used in the horizontal axis. Short horizontal red lines indicate
critical values at the weak selection limit obtained from (2) in the
paper. These values are: Panel A: 0.012, 0.017, 0.044, 0.071.
Panel B: 0.061, 0.075, 0.137, 0.194. Note the extremely low values
of critical relatedness in Panel A. The large values of A can result
from contingent cooperation, based on feedback, as for the IPG.
For instance, suppose that a certain activity repeats itself T times
over a life-cycle. Suppose also that in each repetition the payoff is
well described by the threshold model. If types A discontinue the
participation when their payoff in the previous round was negative
(as in the IPG discussed in Figure 2 in the paper), then the
resulting payoff over the T iterations is also given by a threshold
model, with the same value of C, but A replaced by (A – C)T+C,
and A9 replaced with A9T. This gives plausibility to values of A and
A9 as large as those in this figure, since T can be in the hundreds,
or thousands (see discussion on the IPG in the paper). Figure S9,
Public goods game (Example 1): Perron-Frobenius eigenvectors
n= (n1, …, nn) represented in each box as a histogram, as a
function of the strength of selection d (rows) and of the migration
rate parameter m (columns). Critical migration rates ms are
annotated in each row. Perron-Frobenius eigenvalues r are also
provided for each box. In this picture we have C=1, B=2 and
n=20. Figure S10, Self-organization of copies of A. In these
pictures we have PG with n=2, C=1, B=3, d=0.3, resulting in
ms=0.2889. Pictures show evolution of f(t) = (f1(t), f2(t)), started
from several different initial distributions f(0). Circles over the lines
mark f(t), with t=0, 1, …, 500 obtained by iterations of the map f(t
+1) = f(t)M(A+B). The direction spanned by the eigenvector n is
represented as a dotted green line. Left side (black): cases with r
,1, the allele A is eliminated; right side (red): cases with r .1, the
allele A spreads. In the top row, m is far from ms: (A1) m=0.3389,
r=0.9340, n= (0.8506, 0.1494); (B1) m=0.2389, r=1.078,
n= (0.7342, 0.2658). In the bottom row, m is close to ms: (A2)
m=0.2890, r=0.999856, n= (0.7342, 0.2658); (B2) m=0.2888,
r=1.000014, n= (0.7999, 0.2001). Note that in all cases f(t)
reaches in a few generations a steady state, in which it shrinks (r
,1), or grows (r .1), as a multiple of n. When m approaches ms,
the eigenvalue r becomes close to 1, the stationary movement
along the direction given by n slows down and the trajectories
towards this direction straighten themselves, but are not slowed
down. Figure S11, Self-organization of copies of A. In this
picture we have IPG with n=10, C=1, B=3, T=100, a=2,
d=0.01, and m=0.153, slightly smaller than ms=0.163. Top part
shows evolution of p(t), and bottom part shows corresponding
evolution of f(t) = (f1(t), …, f10(t)), displayed as normalized
histograms. Two initial conditions are compared: (Red) f(0) = 10–
2(1, 0, …, 0), so that p(0) = 10–3. (Black) f(0) = 10–5(0, …, 0, 1), so
that p(0) = 10–5. Note that from generation to generation the
distribution of copies of A adjusts itself to the same stationary
distribution, ‘‘losing memory of the initial distribution’’. Figure
S12, Self-organization of copies of A. This picture corresponds to
the same model and situation described in Figure S11, but with a
different time-frame, including later times. Note that eventually
the two curves of p(t) become parallel straight lines, illustrating the
exponential growth of p(t) at rate r independently of the initial
condition. This picture also illustrates two other important points:
1) The possible non-monotonicity of p(t). 2) The fact that the
asymptotic rate of growth may be smaller than the initial rate of
growth. Indeed, computations of Dp only indicate the long term
prospects for the allele A, when done under stationary conditions,
as in (1). The initial distribution of copies of A in the red line
produces neighbor modulated fitness for A below that of allele N,
so that Dp(0) ,0. In contrast, the initial distribution of copies of A
in the black line produces neighbor modulated fitness for A well
above that of allele N, so that not only Dp(0) .0, but this growth
happens at an unsustainably high rate. The distribution n, towards
which the copies of A self-organize is optimal for their stationary,
stable, growth. This is so because (r, n) is the leading eigenpair of
the driving matrix M(A+B): n is the vector n9 that satisfies the
eigenvalue (stationarity) equation n9M(A+B) = r9n9, with maximum
r9. Figure S13, Self-organization of copies of A. This picture
corresponds to the same model described in Figure S11, but now
m=0.173 is slightly larger than ms=0.163. Note that again
eventually the two curves of p(t) become parallel straight lines,
illustrating in this case the exponential decrease of p(t) at a rate
independent of the initial condition. Here again one can see that
Dp(0) is not indicative of the relevant long term evolution. The self-
organized distribution n is still optimal for the proliferation of the
allele A in a stable, sustainable, fashion. But when r ,1, as in this
picture, this optimal stable distribution is still not good enough for
A to spread, and instead, its copies are eliminated by natural
selection. Figure S14, This diagram illustrates the concept of
identity by descent (IBD) in the 2lFW. Two individuals X an Y in a
given group in generation t, regardless of their type, are identical
by descent (IBD) if their lineages, when followed back in time,
coalesce before a migration event (indicated by a dashed arrow in
the figure in the right panel). Considering a migration rate of m,
migration typically takes place within a random number, of order
1/m of generations back. Figure S15, Perron-Frobenius eigen-
vectors n= nd for selection strengths d=0.01 (left column), d=0.3
(middle column) and d=0.7 (right column). Migration rate is set to
m=0.1 and group sizes to n=20. Each line represents a different
model. The top row, labeled as PG depicts the Public Goods game
(Example 1) with parameters C=1 and B=2. The Iterated Public
Goods game (Example 2) with parameters C=1, B=4, a=4 and
T=10 is shown in row at the middle, labeled as IPG. The bottom
row shows Perron-Frobenius eigenvectors for the Threshold model
(THR, Example 3) with C=1, A=A9=5 and h=4. The leftmost
column emphasizes that the weak selection limit n0k is independent
of the model. In contrast, when selection is strong, nd depends on
the model, as illustrated in the other columns. Figure S16,
Distribution pk (bars) given by p= pQ and
P
n
k~1 pk~1,
compared with kndk
P
k’k’ndk’. Here n
d is the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvector of M(A+B), with d=0.01, for the Threshold model
(THR, Example 3) with parameters n=20, C=1, A=A9=5 and
h=4 (red diamonds). The comparison is repeated for migration
rates m=0.01 (top panel) and m=0.1 (bottom panel). Figure S17,
This diagram illustrates why KD evolves as a Markov chain driven
by Q. In this picture KDu represents the number of individuals that
are IBD to the focal individual F u, in generation u (red circle).
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Two scenarios are discernible. MC1 (left panel): the focal
individual is a migrant. This happens with probability m and
implies that KDu ~1. MC2 (right panel): the focal individual F u is
not a migrant, and she is a child of F u{1. Each individual in the
focal group in generation u chooses a mother from the group of
F u{1 in the previous generation with uniform probability, as
d=0. With probability KDu{1=n the chosen mother is IBD to
F u{1 (orange circles) and, consequently, her children are also IBD
to F u, provided that they are not migrants. In this case, the
number of individuals in generation u that are IBD to the focal is,
therefore, 1 (for the focal individual herself) plus a number of
individuals given by a binomial random variable with probability
of success 1{mð ÞKDu{1=n in n –1 trials. Figure S18, Relatedness
R0 as a function of migration rate m, under neutral drift, d=0, as
given by (S11). From top to bottom, n=20 (dot-dashed blue line),
n=50 (dashed green line) and n=100 (full red line). Figure S19,
Limit of large n and small m under weak selection. This figure
compares tail probabilities for the distribution p (stairs) and for
Beta distributions with parameters a=1 and b=2mn. Panel A
shows the case n=20 for, from top to bottom, m=0.01 (red dotted
line), m=0.1 (blue dashed line) and m=0.5 (black dot dashed line).
Panel B depicts the same scenarios for the case n=100. Figure
S20, Limit of large n under weak selection for the threshold model
(THR, Example 3). Panels represent critical migration rates (A and
C) and critical relatedness (B and D) for the THR with C=1,
A=A9=10 as a function of ~h~h=n . Top panels A and B depict
the case n=20. Bottom panels C and D depict the case n=100. In
each panel critical values obtained by the viability condition under
weak selection derived from (A2) (black full lines) are compared
with the approximation for large n given by (S25) (ms~~ms=n ,
R0s~
~R0s , approx.1, dashed blue lines) and with the approximation
(S26) (approx.2, dotted red lines). Figure S21, Limit of large n
under weak selection for the Iterated public goods (IPG) game
(Example 2). Panels represent critical migration rates (A and C)
and critical relatedness (B and D) for the IPG with C=1, B=5 and
T=100 as a function of ~a~a=n . Top panels A and B depict the
case n=20. Bottom panels C and D depict the case n=100. In
each panel critical values obtained by the viability condition under
weak selection derived from (2) (black full lines) are compared with
the approximation for large n given by solving (S27) in R (approx.,
dashed blue lines). In panel B we have R0s~4:02% when ~a~20%,
and in panel D we have R0s~5:54% when ~a~20%. Types A are
altruistic in the strong sense of (S31) when 0ƒ~aƒ20%. Figure
S22, Limit of large n under weak selection for the Iterated public
goods (IPG) game (Example 2): behavior of solutions for (S27) -
Part 1. Top panel: H(R) corresponds to the l.h.s. of (S27) while G(R)
depicts the r.h.s. of (S27). H(R) is strictly decreasing and it is
positive for R,C/B. Derivatives of G(R) converge to 0 as R R 0.
H(R) and G(R) are equal to each other at exactly one point R~~R0s
that is a decreasing function of C/B. Curves depicted correspond
to the cases C/B=0.5 (full black line), C/B=0.2 (dashed red line)
and C/B=0.1 (dot-dashed blue line) with ~a~C=B and T=100.
Bottom panel: ~R0s as a function of ~a for C/B=0.5 (top, full black
line), C/B=0.2 (middle, dashed red line) and C/B=0.1 (bottom,
dot-dashed blue line) and T=100. ~R0s is continuous in the interval
0ƒ~aƒ1, takes the value C/B on both end-points of this domain
and has a minimum at ~a~C=B . Figure S23, Limit of large n
under weak selection for the Iterated public goods (IPG) game
(Example 2): behavior of solutions for (S27) - Part 2. Top panel:
G(R) and H(R) for C/B=0.5, ~a~0:5 and T=10 (leftmost, full
black line), T=103 (dashed red line) and T=105 (dot-dashed blue
line). ~R0s is a decreasing function of T. Bottom panel: in the limit T
R ‘, if 0ƒ~avC=B then ~R0s?
C=B{~a
1{~a (full magenta line). If
C=Bƒ~aƒ1 then ~R0s?0 very slowly. Figure S24, Limit of large
n under weak selection for the Iterated public goods (IPG) game
(Example 2): behavior of solutions for (S27) - Part 3. H(R) (strictly
decreasing straight line) and G(R) for C/B=0.5 and T=10 for
~a~0:01, 0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 from right to left in Panel A and for
~a~0:5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9, 0.999 from left to right in Panel B. The graph
of G(R) moves upwards for 0ƒ~avC=B and downwards for
C=Bƒ~aƒ1. G(R)R (T –1)(BR – C) as ~a?0 (dashed magenta line
in Panel A). In Panel B it can be seen that G(R) R 0 as ~a?1.
Figure S25, Limit of large n under weak selection for the Iterated
public goods (IPG) game (Example 2): behavior of solutions for
(S27) - Part 4. In all panels C/B=0.5. Panel A depicts ~R0s as a
function of 1/log(T) for ~a~0:3 (full black line) and for ~a~0:7
(dashed red line). For 0ƒ~avC=B ~R0s?
C=B{~a
1{~a
(this value is
approximately 0.286 for the case shown). If C=Bƒ~aƒ1 then ~R0s
converges to 0 very slowly as T increases, more specifically
~R0s*{ log 1{~að Þ= log Tð Þ (dotted magenta line). Bottom panels
show the behavior of G(R) as T increases. Panel B: case ~avC=B
for, from right to left, T=2, 10, 100, 500. Panel A: case ~awC=B
for T=2, 10, 100, 500, from right to left. G(R) stays at zero for
R^~max
C=B{~a
1{~a
,0
 
and goes monotonically to infinity for
R^vRvC=B . Figure S26, The solid lines provide the solution
~R0s of C/B – R= (T –1)R(1– (C/B))
1/R, as a function of C/B, for
(top to bottom) T=1 (black), 10 (blue), 100 (magenta), 1000
(green) and 10000 (cian). The corresponding dashed lines with
same colors (no black one) provide the approximation (A5), R=–
ln(1– (C/B))/ln T. This figure is an expanded version of Panel C of
Figure 2 in the paper.
(PDF)
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